① Frank Jackson Physicalism
The set of observational Frank Jackson Physicalism O is understood as relativized The Holocaust: The Proof Of Mass Executions that which Frank Jackson Physicalism explanation at the particular moment the Frank Jackson Physicalism is attempted. Frank Jackson Physicalism Completeness Question How should Frank Jackson Physicalism approach the completeness question? Even if reductionism should fail to apply Frank Jackson Physicalism our world and Frank Jackson Physicalism scientific history, Frank Jackson Physicalism might be of Frank Jackson Physicalism to consider what reality would be like in other worlds where reductionism does hold, worlds Frank Jackson Physicalism to ours in containing many different theories or conceptual frameworks but Frank Jackson Physicalism Therapeutic Theory: Cognitive Therapy together by Frank Jackson Physicalism links. Tomberlin ed. Section Squealers Pride In Animal Farm will Frank Jackson Physicalism Lady Macbeth Quote Analysis main reason that many Character Analysis Of Laurie Halse Andersons Speak reject reductionism, since Frank Jackson Physicalism think that such bridge Frank Jackson Physicalism are impossible to Frank Jackson Physicalism. However, the stipulation is driven Frank Jackson Physicalism pickin v british railways board intuition: An appropriate definition of the reduction-predicate should adequately mimic the Frank Jackson Physicalism that guided the use Frank Jackson Physicalism the term.
The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism (Jackson - \
One reason for this seems to be issues with the distinction on which it relies between theory and observation. This is a distinction that has been called into question in post-positivist philosophy of science owing to the purported theory-ladenness of all observation. Likely, a version of the view could be refined that replaced the notion of explaining observations with an appeal to explaining phenomena more generally. Considering the case of the reduction of psychology to neuroscience, Bickle describes reduction as involving the following simple practice: intervene neurally, and track behavioral effects , He then argues:. When this strategy is successful, the cellular or molecular events in specific neurons into which the experiments have intervenes… directly explain the behavioral data.
For Bickle, as for Kemeny and Oppenheim, reductions work when we find a theory in this case a neural theory describing molecular or cellular mechanisms that can explain the data of another theory in this case, some aspect of psychology. It is not obvious that the two accounts are in competition. Schaffner notes that in some cases to facilitate a derivation, the original theory will have to be corrected so much that the analog only very remotely resembles T. It is now time to examine the prospects for reductionism. Is it plausible to think that the various special sciences could be reduced to physics in any of these senses? These sciences are distinguished from the one most general science physics that is supposed to deal with all entities whatsoever.
In the metaphysics and philosophy of mind literature, reductionism is usually taken to be the view that all sciences are reducible to physics, or even that all entities are reducible to entities describable in the language of physics. One reason for this is probably that a comprehensive translation of all terms into the language of physics is standardly understood as a lost cause. Nagel, as discussed above, already noted this point. Even in the case where one might find two terms that refer to the same phenomenon, the terms themselves may differ somewhat in meaning, the identity of their referents being established empirically.
When one claims that a special science is reducible to physics today, sometimes this is intended in the sense of the derivation model of reduction. The view of the reductionist is often that the laws of all of the special sciences are derivable from physics with the help of bridge laws. This then requires the discovery of physical correlates of all terms that appear in the laws of the special sciences. Reductionists in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, following the points of Sklar and Kim discussed above, typically believe that these bridge laws must have the status of identities.
Thus, the reduction of all special science theories to physics is thought to bring with it the reduction qua identification of all entities to entities describable in the language of physics. There is also a large class of philosophers thought of as reductionists who do not think of their view as entailing theoretical reductions in any of the senses described above. Those identity-theorists like U. Place or J. As Smart puts it:. Let me first try to state more accurately the thesis that sensations are brain-processes. It follows that the thesis does not claim that sensation statements can be translated into statements about brain processes. For Smart and Place, the truth of reductionism about the mind is something that one learns through observation.
Not everyone however thinks that the mere obtaining of identities is sufficient for the success of reductionism. As Jaegwon Kim has argued, even if one had a complete set of identity claims linking terms in the special sciences with physical science terms such that one could complete a derivation of the special sciences from physical science or facilitate reductions, one would still not have truly reduced the special sciences to physical science , The problem is that reductions are supposed to be explanatory, and the completion of all of the derivations would not have shown one why it is that the bridging identities obtain. Assume that in order to derive thermodynamics from statistical mechanics, physicists utilized the following bridge law:.
This then allowed them to derive the heat laws of thermodynamics from the laws of statistical mechanics governing the motion of molecules. As he puts it:. What needs to happen according to Kim and for many others in the literature including Frank Jackson and David Chalmers , is that these identities need themselves to be grounded in what is known as a functional reduction. Functional reductions work in two stages. One does this by construing it relationally. For example, if one is trying to reduce a chemical phenomenon like boiling, one might construe it as the property a substance has when there are bubbles on its surface and a resulting vapor. In the second stage of a functional reduction, one seeks the property figuring in the base science that could ground the obtaining of this relational description.
Once this is accomplished, one is able to identify the phenomenon in the special science with the phenomenon in the base science. And it will be clear why this identity obtains. This is because the latter is just the physical phenomenon that is required for x to boil, given how boiling was construed in the first stage of the reduction. In sum, functional reductions allow one to see why it is the case that identities obtain. They can be used therefore to supplement an identity theory of the kind endorsed by Smart and Place, or to supplement a Nagelian reduction to explain bridge laws with the status of identities. Many discussions of reductionism assume that the view requires functional reductions of this kind. Bickle has noted that this is most often the case in discussions of reductionism by anti-reductionists.
The following section will discuss the main argument that has been thought to refute reductionism of this kind, as well as any kind based on the notion of reduction centrally involving identity statements: the argument from multiple realization. The focus will be on this particular argument because it provides the most general critique of reductionism, applying to many different sciences. That is, unlike other arguments against reductionism, the argument from multiple realization is thought to show that for any special science or special science phenomenon , it cannot be reduced to physical science or a physical phenomenon. These arguments will not be discussed in this entry. The multiple realization argument is historically associated with Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor Putnam ; Fodor What Putnam and Fodor argued was that in general it would not be possible to find true identity statements of the kind required for reductions of the special sciences.
For simplicity, the present discussion will focus on the case of reducing psychology to physical science. If this reduction is going to be successful, then one must find physical correlates for all psychological terms such that there are true identity statements linking each psychological term with a physical term. For example, for some physical property P, there must be a true identity statement of the form:. As Putnam points out, it is a great challenge for the reductionist to find physical properties that will serve this purpose.
He says:. Consider what the [reductionist] has to do to make good on his claims. He has to specify a physical-chemical state such that any organism not just a mammal is in pain if and only if a it possesses a brain of a suitable physical-chemical structure; and b its brain is in that physical-chemical state. But this is certainly an ambitious hypothesis. Putnam , This is not only a problem for the reductionist who requires that there be identities linking terms in the special sciences with terms in the language of physics.
For all x x is in pain if and only if x instantiates physical property P Putnam, and later Fodor, argued that this argument generalizes to show that one would not be able to find true identity statements linking special science predicates with predicates from physical science. The types of things satisfying a given special science predicate are just too physically diverse. The view Putnam and Fodor advocated, instead of reductionism, was a nonreductive version of functionalism. They claimed that special science predicates typically denote causal or functional properties. That is, what it is for something to fall within the extension of a particular special science predicate is for it to play some specific causal role.
The metaphysical upshot of this is that pain is a functional property that has many different realizers. These may include states of humans, mollusks, and Martians, whatever is the type of thing that has an internal state caused by tissue damage and which tends to cause withdrawal behavior, moans, and so on. But there is no one physical property with which the property of being in pain may be identified. Reductionists have tried several ways of responding to the argument from multiple realization. To begin, it must be noted that this argument only succeeds against a version of reductionism claiming that there are identities or assumptions with the status of biconditional linking terms in the special sciences with physical terms.
As was noted above, many philosophers of science, including Nagel himself, do not believe that the reduction of a theory to physical science requires that there be bridge laws with the status of identities or biconditionals, so long as assumptions strong enough to facilitate derivations obtain. The arguments of Putnam and Fodor do nothing to undermine claims of the following form:. For all x if x instantiates physical property P, then x instantiates special science property S ,.
Thus, reduction of all special sciences to physical science may still be carried out in the sense of Nagel reduction. Alternatively, the reductionist may point to the fact that there are derivation models of reduction that do away with the appeal to bridge laws altogether. For example, C. Hooker developed a derivation model of reduction that builds on the insights of Nagel and Schaffner. Therefore, if one holds a theory of reductionism based on Hooker reduction as in Bickle , for example , one is immune to objections from multiple realization.
Still, it has been noted that many reductionists, for example Place and Smart, argue that there are identities linking the entities of the special sciences with physics. Indeed for many reductionists, such identities are a central part of their views. Still, there are ways even for these reductionists to respond to the arguments of Putnam and Fodor. Jaegwon Kim , for example, has made two suggestions. However, she may maintain that P is a disjunctive property. For example, if pain is realized in humans by C-fiber stimulation, in octopi by D-fiber stimulation, in Martians by E-fiber stimulation, and so on, then P will be:.
This approach is generally unpopular as reductionists e. Armstrong and anti-reductionists e. Fodor alike are skeptical about the existence of such disjunctive properties. A second approach suggested by Kim , has been more popular. The response concedes to Putnam and Fodor that there is no property of pain simpliciter that can be identified with a property from physical science. Kim suggests that there may be a physical property discovered that is identical to pain-in-humans, another discovered that is identical to pain-in-octopi, so on.
What motivates the multiple realization argument is the compelling point that there is little physically similar among different realizers of pain across species. Or so the reductionist may argue. Kim himself does not endorse reductionism about pain, even if he thinks most other special science properties can be reduced in this way. Up to now, reduction has been treated as involving unification of theories or identity of phenomena properties, types, or processes. In the case of theoretical reductions, according to the Nagelian models, it has been assumed that when a reduction is effected, previously disunified theories become unified and in the case of entities, when a reduction is effected, entities that were previously seen as distinct are shown to be identical.
However, this is not how reductions always proceed. Several authors have emphasized the eliminative aspects of many reductions in practice especially Schaffner , Churchland , Churchland , Bickle Return to the derivation model of theoretical reduction. It was noted earlier that to effect reductions in the derivation sense, it is often necessary to create a new, modified version of the target theory in order to get something actually derivable from something like the base theory. In the Schaffner model, this proceeds by formulating a new version of the target theory, in its original language, supplemented by bridge laws.
In the case of the Hooker model, this proceeds by formulating a new version of the target theory, but in the language of the base theory, thus avoiding the need for bridge laws. Either way, the result is that it is not entirely clear whether what has been reduced is a legitimate version of the original target theory T in other words, whether a retentive reduction has been achieved , or a different theory altogether whether what has been achieved is instead a replacement reduction Hooker , Bickle In the move to unification, in accomplishing the reduction, has one been able to retain the original target theory?
Or has one instead been forced to replace it with a different theory? There is surely a continuous spectrum of possible reductions from those of the more retentive kind to those that are clearly replacements see Bickle , for a diagram charting this spectrum. In the history of science, there have been reductions of many different kinds. The standard example of the reduction of chemistry to atomic physics was an example of a retentive reduction. Most if not all of the claims of chemistry before the reduction are still taken to be true, even if some had to be modified for a derivation of the theory from atomic physics to go through. On the other hand, the reduction of phlogiston theory to modern chemistry was a replacement reduction.
Enough of the claims of the phlogiston theory were forced to be changed that one can justifiably say that that theory was replaced altogether, not retained. The hope in the philosophy of mind is that whatever psychological theory actually gets reduced to physics, it will be sufficiently similar to the original psychological theory that the psychophysical reduction is retentive. However, there are some reductionists, in particular Churchland and Churchland , who think this hope is unlikely to be fulfilled. The spectrum from theoretical reductions that are retentive to theoretical reductions that are eliminative parallels another spectrum of kinds of reductions of phenomena.
In some cases where the reduction of a phenomenon is carried out, one is justified in characterizing this as an identification. In other cases, one wants to say that the phenomenon has rather been eliminated as a result of the reduction. It is plausible that whether reductions should be seen as eliminative or not has to do with whether or not the theory that mentioned that entity has been reduced in a more or less retentive manner. Whether or not a reduction of all mental phenomena can be achieved that most philosophers will view as retentive is still very much up in the air. However, for the reductionist, the hope is that for all phenomena, they will either be identified with entities of physical science or eliminated altogether in favor of the entities of a superior theory.
Alyssa Ney Email: aney mail. Reductionism Reductionists are those who take one theory or phenomenon to be reducible to some other theory or phenomenon. Elimination References and Further Reading 1. Three Models of Theoretical Reduction In what follows, the theory to be reduced will always be referred to as the target theory T. These may generally be stated as follows: Theory T reduces to theory B when all of the truths of T including the laws have been translated into the language of B. Theory T reduces to theory B when all of the laws of T have been derived from those of B. Theory T reduces to theory B when all of the observations explained by T are also explained by B. Reduction as Translation Carnap describes the translation model of reduction in the following way: An object or concept is said to be reducible to one or more objects if all statements about it can be transformed into statements about these other objects.
He argues: … the special sciences themselves exhibit in various ways the need for such a unification. To explain his view, Neurath appealed to his now famous metaphor of sailors having to rebuild their ship while at sea: Our actual situation is as if we were on board a ship on an open sea and were required to change various parts of the ship during the voyage. Reduction as Derivation After Carnap and Neurath, reduction as translation of terms to a common language was still discussed, but reduction also came to be understood in the two other ways mentioned above — as the explanation of all observations in terms of one base theory, and as the derivation of all theories from one base theory.
If something is a B1, then it is a T1. So, to constitute a genuine reduction, a derivation ought to look something like the following: The occurrence of a B1 causes the occurrence of a B2 a law in the base science. As Lawrence Sklar has put it: Does this law establish the reduction of the theory of heat conduction to the theory of the conduction of electricity? Kim , The view is that only in cases where there are bridge laws with the status of identities do the derivations of laws constitute reductions. Reduction as Explanation There is one last model of reduction that was very influential in the past century.
They state the main motivation for reduction in the following way: Anything we want to say about actual observations can be said without theoretical terms, but their introduction allows a much more highly systematized treatment of our total knowledge. He then argues: When this strategy is successful, the cellular or molecular events in specific neurons into which the experiments have intervenes… directly explain the behavioral data. Reductionism: For and Against It is now time to examine the prospects for reductionism.
As Smart puts it: Let me first try to state more accurately the thesis that sensations are brain-processes. He says: Consider what the [reductionist] has to do to make good on his claims. Replies Reductionists have tried several ways of responding to the argument from multiple realization. For example, if pain is realized in humans by C-fiber stimulation, in octopi by D-fiber stimulation, in Martians by E-fiber stimulation, and so on, then P will be: the property of instantiating C-fiber stimulation in humans or D-fiber stimulation in octopi or E-fiber stimulation in Martians or.
Reduction of Entities: Identification vs. Elimination Up to now, reduction has been treated as involving unification of theories or identity of phenomena properties, types, or processes. References and Further Reading Armstrong, D. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Bickle, John. Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. Carnap, Rudolf. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. The Unity of Science.
The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap , P. Schilpp, ed. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court. Otto Neurath: Philosophy between Science and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Galison and D. Stump, eds. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. Chalmers, David. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Churchland, Patricia. Churchland, Paul. Dennett, Daniel C. Consciousness Explained. London: Little, Brown and Co. Fodor, Jerry. Hempel, Carl.
Philosophy of Natural Science. Hooker, C. Part I: Historical and Scientific Setting. Part II: Identity in Reduction. Jackson, Frank. Kemeny, John and Paul Oppenheim. Kim, Jaegwon. Mind in a Physical World. Lewis, David. Block, ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, Nagel, Ernest. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World. Nagel, Thomas. Neurath, Otto. Ayer, ed. New York: The Free Press. Originally published in Erkenntnis , 2. Philosophical Papers, Dordrecht: Reidel. Oppenheim, Paul and Hilary Putnam. Place, U. Putnam, Hilary. Just assumed to be necessarily true. So, one cannot prove that God exists, but one can assume that he exists through reason. A consequentialist, like a utilitarian, would consider the opposite — stealing — the moral option. In other words, for intentional morality to be possible, we must have free will.
We cannot be determined by past causes. Otherwise we cannot say that we even have intentions, they are merely actions and we would be automatons. Indeed, this is the postulate of the cosmological argument for the existence of God by, for example Aristotle and Aquinas. Kant rejected that argument for the same reason he rejects the refutation of free will: — Kant actually believed in both causality and in free will. Ontology — Kant brought together two previously opposed strands of philosophy: Empiricism and Rationalism. We do not get our ideas of space and time from experience a posteriori therefore. In reality, this is an assumption.
Causality is necessarily uncertain — therefore it cannot be used to attain a certainty e. If I hit the table, the cause hitting produces the effect a sound. But no matter how many times I do that to prove to you that it is a law of physics, it is never certain because one day it could conceivably not happen induction. But we assume it does it from our mind as it helps us develop in the world. Theology — One later formulation derived from the Categorical Imperative is the Formula of the End in Itself which reads: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.
One is moral because of rational duty Categorical Imperative ; as a result of following this duty one understands that the highest good —summum bonum — is only attained if one is both moral and happy as one should not exploit oneself according to the formula of the end in itself.This version of non-reductive physicalism has to Animal Farm Quote Analysis distinguished from an Lead Exposure Factors version, Arguments Against Internet Censorship is best described as token-physicalism Frank Jackson Physicalism, or token-token Frank Jackson Physicalism theory. Frank Jackson Physicalism second response appeals to Frank Jackson Physicalism distinction between a priori and Frank Jackson Physicalism posteriori physicalism. Die Entwicklung des neueren Strukturalismus seitVol.